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ABSTRACT 
 
According to studies conducted by researchers across the globe, in recent years there has been an increase in 
organization and company attacks. Some attacks have been detected, but others, however, were able to bypass the 
security mechanisms, taking advantage of an unknown vulnerability in security systems. In this context, Honeypots 
systems aim to collect information on the intruder’s activities and learn about threats and attackers’ behavior. 
Honeypots systems are not designed to remedy failures or security errors on the network, but are responsible for 
providing adequate information on potential attackers before compromising real systems. In this paper, a honeypot 
system was designed to study the techniques used by attackers. We designed and implemented a malware analysis 
laboratory based on honeypots technology in a controlled environment to analyze various security incidents. The 
use of honeypots is based on the idea of simulating applications with vulnerabilities and recording all events 
produced by attackers, so the network administrator can learn about the different types of attacks to protect 
organizational systems that are being produced. The results have been very important in terms of the number and 
types of security incidents recorded by the honeypots. Also, an administration interface for controlling and 
analyzing the gathered information was designed. This system was not only implemented but also tested for several 
weeks and data was collected from the attacks was analyzed.  This led to some interesting statistics and 
characteristics about attackers and their goals.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
he purpose of this study is to defend the information infrastructure, detect faults in structures, and 
correct them proactively. In recent years, attacks generated by individuals with malicious purposes, 
have increased significantly. This, combined with existing vulnerabilities in all types of operating 
systems and applications, results in organizations becoming a potential victim. While security is closely linked to 
knowing that there is no absolute certainty, what we're struggling to do is to cushion the impacts and risks by 
combining different existing tools. Therefore, in this context, it is of paramount importance to consider new 
strategies and techniques to generate an extra protection layer. This is where honeypots technology, through which 
attacks and network vulnerabilities are known in detail play a vital role. Honeypots are used to obtain valuable 
information on threats, which can be observed, analyzed, and monitored to prevent further attacks and to identify the 
techniques used by the attackers. 
 
2. OBJECTIVE 
 
The main purpose of this paper is to propose the creation of a test bed that will help network administrators analyze 
malware and monitor their behavior.  The requirement for such an instrument resulted from the disclosure, in the 
greater part of the examination papers that were read, that scientists never said how they set up their test. The main 
objectives of the paper are: 
 
• Develop a malware laboratory using virtual machines and honeypots to capture and analyze malware. 
More precisely, the laboratory should give room to the ability to create an infinite number of network 
environments combining different operating systems and applications that facilitate the study of 
malware in the wild. To create these isolated environments, we have used virtualization technology. 
This technology will give way to the creation of isolated environments, flexible and scalable, where we 
can run as many experiments as we need. 
T 
Journal of Cybersecurity Research – 2018 Volume 3, Number 1  
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 2 The Clute Institute 
• Design of a platform to manage the infected computers and the analyzed malware itself. 
• Development of a main repository to store and analyze malware. 
 
3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.1 Honeypot 
 
A honeypot is an intentionally exposed computational resource which is aimed at being tested, attacked, 
compromised, used, or accessed in any unauthorized way. The resource can be a System Service, an Application 
User or Server, a complete System, or just a piece of information such as records in a database or office documents 
(ENISA, 2012). In a production environment, any attempt to access or interaction with the honeypot is suspicious 
activity. All activities between a supposed attacker and the honeypot are monitored and analyzed in order to detect 
and confirm an unauthorized use. In this way, it is possible to take preventive measures or provide for contingency. 
 
 
Figure 1. Honeypots classification 
 
 
 
 
3.2 Placement 
 
3.2.1 At the External Network  
 
Placing a honeypot in the public address space of an organization, for example, before a BGP (Border Gateway 
Protocol) router, gives way to a lot of pieces of information targeted from the Internet. This is the most deployed 
solution in research environments since it enables a researcher to collect a large amount of malware samples and to 
detect attacks and zero-day vulnerabilities. Locating the honeypot at this location reduces the risk on the internal 
network in case it was compromised and used as a jumping machine to access or infect other computers in the 
network (Joshi & Sardana, 2011)  
 
3.2.2 At the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)  
 
This architecture is the most difficult to implement because the honeypots are exposed to Internet services and 
internal networks. Therefore, the security level must be critical. A honeypot in the DMZ can collect information and 
alert about external attacks to those services allowed by the firewall of the DMZ. The honeypot can detect 
unauthorized actions from the internal network as well (Joshi & Sardana, 2011).  
 
3.2.3 At the Internal Network  
 
In the network there are PCs and backend servers. Within the internal network exists separate subnetworks, 
according to purpose, Geographic Location or Ownership. Therefore, a network segment without a previously 
assigned address can be used to deploy one or more honeypots. This separation facilitates network administration, 
but also enables honeypots to identify internal attacks because the traffic from other internal networks should not 
interact with the honeypots. Therefore, such an activity would be considered suspicious (Joshi & Sardana, 2011). 
 
HONEY POT 
Resource Type 
Client Mode Server Mode 
Honeytokens 
Interaction Level 
High Low 
Hybrid Purpose 
Research Production 
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3.3 Honeypots vs. Other Technologies  
 
There are several technologies and tools oriented to malware analysis and intrusion detection (Joshi & Sardana, 
2011). The one we choose will depend on our needs. 
 
Sandboxes are security mechanisms that enable files to run in isolated environments and get information from 
actions they take. This technology is used in malware analysis. Generally, they perform a dynamic and real-time 
analysis of programs or files executed in a virtual operating system. Sandboxes are used to study malware samples 
once they have been captured by another tool, for example through honeypots. Some examples of sandboxes are 
Cuckoo and Anubis (Egele, Scholte, Kirda, &Kruegel,2011; Oktavianto&Muhardianto, 2013).  
 
IDS/IPS are technologies based on the detection and mitigation of network attacks. They inspect network packets 
for suspicious patterns. These tools do not capture malware but may block some activities. Generally, IDS/IPS are 
used in conjunction with other security tools (firewalls, honeypots, honeynets, etc.). Some examples are Snort and 
Suricata (China Appala Naidu, & Avadhani, 2013). 
 
Antivirus is another tool used for analyzing and detecting malware. They are a security measure implemented on 
local computers. They contanalyze the file system of a computer continuously looking for binaries containing code 
patterns classified as malignant. Online antivirus engines have become a very useful tool for static analysis of files. 
As an example, the most popular are VirusTotal, Jotti and Metascan (Ligh, Adair, Hartstein & Richard, 2010).  
 
3.4 Honeynets 
 
A honeynet is a network architecture composed of honeypots, network devices, and security tools. Honeypots in a 
honeynet are real operating systems, that is, they are high-interaction honeypots. When the systems of a honeynet 
are attacked, the honeynet logs all information about the activities taking place (Spitzner, 2002). For that purpose, 
there are a number of common components to every honeynet: 
 
• Router: Routes the traffic to the different devices in the honeynet. 
• Firewall: Restricts incoming and outgoing traffic to/from the honeynet.  
• IDS/IPS: Detection and prevention system which enables to analyze network packets traffic and 
content in more detail.  
• Server Logs: The information collected by honeypots and the rest of devices are sent to a centralized 
logs Server.  
 
3.5 Virtual and Physical Honeynets  
 
In a physical honeynet, honeypots and other systems are running on separate physical machines. A virtual honeynet 
deploys honeypots and other systems on virtual machines which run on the same physical machine (Lu, Tavallaee, 
Rammidi & Ghorbani, 2008). There are two types of virtual honeynets: 
 
• Self-Contained Honeynet: All components (honeypots, honeywall, IDS, router, etc.) are implemented 
on the same physical machine by using virtualization.  
• Hybrid Honeynet: Honeypots run on virtual machines within the same physical machine, but the basic 
devices (honeywall, IDS, router etc.) are deployed on another physical machine. Hybrid honeynets 
imply a security enhancement which decreases the likelihood of having the full honeynet compromised 
by an attacker.  
 
4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
In this work, we used different tools to build a unique framework, to have a centralized console that will be used by 
scientists to have access to the entire system.  This console has a database which stores information about studied 
bots, but also virtual machines used to analyze them. This console is used to manage the whole system. The system 
design can be found in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. System design 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Architecture 
 
The architecture corresponds to a Virtual Hybrid Honeynet, as shown in Figure 3. For its development we will use 
two physical machines: (1) the Honeywall and (2) used by virtualization software, raise two virtual machines that 
correspond to the honeypots. In our experiment, we used the operating systems: Windows XP and the Linux Debian 
distribution. 
 
Figure 3. Honeynet architecture 
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4.2 Implementation 
 
4.2.1 Hardware 
 
For the implementation, we will use only one physical machine. We first give the minimum characteristics of the 
host machine hosting the virtual machines:  
 
• Processor Pentium Dual Core 1.7 GHz 
• Memory 1 GB RAM 
• Hard Drive 300 GB 
• Network Adapter 10/100/1000 Mbps 
 
The implemented virtual machines form a virtual network within the host machine, as shown in Figure 4, and the 
minimum hardware requirements are listed in the Table 1: 
 
 
Figure 4. Virtual Honeynet Architecture 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Operating Systems 
OS Hard Drive Memory (RAM) 
Linux Debian 30 GB 512 MB 
Windows XP 30 GB 512 MB 
Honeywall 100 GB 256 MB 
 
 
4.2.2 Network Setting 
 
The network diagram in Figure 5 shows a view of the Honeynet with physical and virtual components. A single 
physical machine is connected directly to the switch next to the production network. The host is a Linux Fedora 
distribution using VMware virtualization software to host the three virtual machines in the Honeywall. The 
Honeywall [1] uses three virtual network interfaces (one in bridge mode and two in host only mode). Honeypots [3 
and 4] use the host mode network interface only. Only in Host mode virtual machine can connect to the hosting 
machine and other virtual ones with similar configurations, creating an internal private network isolated from the 
rest of the external network.  In the Bridged mode, virtual machines use the same host's network connection, but are 
connected are different terminals. 
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Figure 5. Virtual Honeynet Architecture 
 
 
 
 
4.2.3 Configuration of the Honeynet Connectivity 
 
The external and internal networks of honeynet are placed in segments with different IP addressing. This 
configuration is not ideal since the honeywall should act as a bridge between two segments with the same address. 
The decision to implement networks with different address for internal and external segments of the honeynet is due 
to hardware limitations and VMware’s characteristics. Given that the entire honeynet and machine attacker is 
implemented on the same physical computer, connectivity through the VMware virtual Switch does not permit to 
configure the desired routing. One possible solution to the problem would be to include a physical network device 
between the honeywall and the attacker machine.  
 
• External honeynet interface: 
o IP: 192.168.30.0/24 
o Interface: eth0.  
o VMware switch: Host-Only  
(vmnet 5) 
• Internal honeynet interface:  
o IP: No IP 
o Interface: eth1.  
o VMware switch: Host-Only  
(vmnet3) 
• Management honeywall interface:  
o IP: 192.168.50.10/24 
o Interface: eth2.  
o VMware switch: Host-Only 
o (vmnet4) 
• Bridge interface: 
o HoneywallRoo creates a bridge interface br0 automatically. It detects and associates interfaces 
eth0 and eth1 in order to form a transparent bridge. 
 
To control outside connections generated by the attacker, the number of connections allowed are limited. This will 
limit the effectiveness of an attack from the honeypot to third systems. The number of connections has to be 
adjusted depending on the environment and purpose of the honeynet. Tables 2, 3, and 4 indicate the maximum 
number of connections allowed. 
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Table 2. INPUT chain rules 
Action Protocol Interface In Source Destination Ports 
Accept Any Loopback Any Any Any 
Accept TCP Eth2 192.168.50.0/24 Any 24, 443 
Drop Any Any Any Any Any 
 
 
Table 3. OUTPUT chain rules 
Action Protocol Interface In Source Destination Ports 
Accept Any Loopback Any Any Any 
Accept TCP eth2 any Any 20, 21, 22, 25, 80, 443 
Accept UDP eth2 Any Any 53, 123, 69 
Drop Any Any Any Any Any 
 
 
Table 4. FORWARD chain rules 
Action Protocol Interface In Interface Out Source Destination Ports 
Accept Any Any Any Any 192.168.30.255 Any 
Accept Any Any Any Any 255.255.255.255 Any 
Accept Any eth0 Any Any Any Any 
Accept UDP eth1 Any Any 192.168.50.10 65000 
Accept UDP eth1 Any Any 255.255.255.255 Src. 68 Dest. 67 
Accept TCP/UDP eth1 Any 192.168.30.100 Any 53 
Accept Any eth1 eth1 Any Any Any 
Accept TCP eth1 Any 192.168.30.100 Any Any-200 connections/hour 
Accept Any eth1 Any 192.168.300.100 Any Any- 100 connections/hour 
 
 
5. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
5.1 Central module 
 
It is used to manage and control the whole system, by connecting different parts of the system, using interfaces to 
view and set functions as: 
 
• View the honeypot logs.  
• View Snort Alerts 
• View Complete Packet Logs 
• View honeypots connections 
• Change settings 
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Figure 6. Honeypot Malware Analysis LaboratoryInterface 
 
 
 
 
5.2 Connections 
 
As the system is running, we can list all incoming and outgoing connections of the honeynet in general and of each 
particular honeypot.  We use SNORT to analyze alerts generated and create rules based on the input information to 
test the entire system. 
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Figure 7. Honeypot Malware Analysis Laboratory connections 
 
 
 
 
5.3 Statistics 
 
Information about type and quantity of data is important to analyze malware in network traffic. We use NTOP to 
that purpose. 
 
 
Figure 8. Attacks on the honeynet over the entire time interval 
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Figure 9 below shows overall honeypot attack activity over the weekdays. Figure 10 shows attacks statistics by level 
domain. 
 
 
Figure 9. Weekdays attacks statistics 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Level domains attacks statistics 
 
 
 
 
We finally provide some other interesting statistics in Figure 11. 
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Figure 11. Accessed resources statistics 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Hourly attacks statistics 
 
 
 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
The logical evolution of systems is not attack-free against malicious software. On this score, their study, analysis 
and early detection are the most important elements to prevent them. Honeynets enable us to collect malware 
samples and attack vectors for a later study with the ultimate goal for developing protection techniques. From our 
experiment and results gathered, we have shown that honeypots are powerful tools that enable us to study and 
analyze the type of malware and attacks and also serve as early warning systems against security incidents and first 
line of defense against attacks. We have implemented a self-contained virtual honeynet along with a high interaction 
honeypot. The data collected by our honeynet enables us to obtain information that would not have been possible 
otherwise. Systems can be used by any scientist working on malware by adapting tools to his one specific question 
of research.   
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